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1 Introduction 
 Shadow banking is a phenomenon that is expanding so rapidly in China and the other 
parts of the world. As a financial innovation under the circumstance of the ‗‗financial 
repression‖, the appearance of shadow banking reduced the indirect financing of the 
commercial bank to total social financing ratio. The financial crises that occurred in 2007 has 
increased people‘s awareness and highlighted the importance of shadow banking system. 
China‘s mounting shadow banking system has acted a substitute for financing within the 
formal financial system. On the one hand, it can enrich the channels of financing and 
investments and promote the interest rate linearization. On the other hand, the shadow banking 
system has been weaking and challenging the Chinese central bank‘s monetary policy. China 
has actively involved in the global financial system and be an influential economy power since 
last three decades. Major default in the Chinese shadow banking system could affect the 
world‘s financial markets in the same manner  [that the financial bubble created after Lehman 
Brothers in the US in 2007 lead to the world‘s financial crisis] (Sebastian,2015). Thus, it 
becomes so important to enhance the regulation of the shadow banking finance in order to 
avoid the risk. 
      The aim of the thesis is to identify both the positive effect of the shadow banking 
bring and more importantly the potential risks of this activity. Then, we propose several 
solutions to reduce the risk. As research methods, we use the comparison approach to compare 
the shadow banking situation in China and the United States (US) and the qualitative method 
of investigating the case of shadow banking in the Chinese economy. 
 The thesis is made up of five main parts. The first Chapter is the basic introduction and 
the overview of the shadow banking problem. The second Chapter we illustrates the overall 
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theoretical background of the banking system, the non-banking financial institution, 
securitization and the shadow banking. In the third Chapter we compare the similarities and 
differences of shadow banking in China and the United States (US). As  the China‘s and the 
US shadow banking systems differ widely in many aspects, for example, the size of shadow 
banking system are different. And the financial products and financial intermediates which 
participate in their shadow banking system are different. In the fourth Chapter, we 
demonstrate the primary financial products and activities that have been actively participating 
in  the China‘s shadow banking system. We illustrate all potential risks connected to these 
financial products and activities. Then, we put forward several solutions to reduce the risks. At 
very last, in Chapter five, we conclude that the China's shadow banking system is a growing 
problem in a booming economy. The main risks faced by Chinese banks stem from the 
shadow banking sector, the housing market and the quality of bank loans to local authorities. 
These parts of economies are connected to each other which creates extra risk. Thus, we 
present several possible solutions to the risk by the means of enhanced regulation. Overall, 
through this thesis, we present the China‘s shadow banking finance systematically and 
comprehensively. 
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2 Theoretical background of the shadow banking system 
2.1 Traditional banking system  
The banking business has experienced substantial change over the last 30 years or so as 
banks have transformed their operations by relatively narrow activities to full-service financial 
firms. According to Casu and Girardone (2006), the banking system is the structural network 
of institutions that offer financial services within a country. There are three major participation 
roles in the banking systems that are central banks, commercial banks, and investment banks 
respectively. Besides, we should always give importance to the regulation authority in the 
banking system within the board.  
2.1.1 Central bank 
2.1.1.1 The objectives of central bank 
The Central bank is the principal monetary authority of a country or a group of countries 
and crucial to the functioning of all banks, financial markets, and the economy. Based on Casu 
(2006) central banks are focusing on the behavior and operation of banks. Central banks exist 
to ensure the safety and soundness of its country‘s financial system. For example, there are the 
European Central Bank (the European Union), the People‘s Bank of China (China), and the 
Federal Reserve System (the United States). 
2.1.1.2 The roles and basic functions of a central bank 
Casu et al. (2006) state that the core functions of central banks in any countries are: to 
manage monetary policy with the aim of achieving price stability, to prevent liquid crises, 
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situations of money market disorders and financial crises, and to ensure the smooth 
functioning of payment system.  
Their daily activities contain buying and selling government debt, determining and 
maintaining interest rates, setting reserve requirement levels, issuing currency, regulating and 
supervising banks and arranging payments between banks. Some central banks are also 
charged with maintaining certain foreign exchange rate levels for the home currency. 
2.1.2 Commercial bank 
2.1.2.1 The objectives of a commercial bank 
Commercial banks are the major financial intermediary in any economy. From Mishkin 
(2013) we will know the primary objective of a commercial bank is to generate profitability 
for its ownership by providing quality based products and services to the residents of the 
communities and regions that they represent. Commercial banks are essential banks that are in 
the classic banking business of accepting deposits and making loans.  
2.1.2.2 The roles and basic functions of commercial bank 
Casu (2006) presents that commercial bank performing many functions: they satisfy the 
financial needs of the sectors such as agriculture, industry, trade, communication, so they play 
very significant role in a process of economic, social needs. The functions performed by banks, 
since recently, are becoming customer-oriented, and their functions have been widening. 
They are the leading providers of credit to the household and corporate sector and operate 
the payments mechanism. Commercial banks are typically joint stock companies and may be 
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either publicly listed on the stock exchange or privately owned. Commercial banks deal with 
both retail and corporate customers, have the well diversified deposit and lending books and 
offer a full range of financial services. The largest banks in most countries are commercial 
banks, and they include household names such as Citibank, HSBC, Deutsche Bank and 
Barclays. While commercial banking refers to institutions whose primary business is deposit 
taking and lending it should always be remembered that the largest commercial banks also 
engage in investment banking, insurance, and other financial services areas. They are also the 
key operators in most countries‘ retail banking markets.  
2.1.3 Investment bank 
2.1.3.1 The objectives of an investment bank 
In the beginning, according to Mishkin (2013), investment bank was to help companies to 
raise capital through equity offerings and debt issuance and to advise and assist with mergers 
and acquisitions. Since then the role of the investment bank has evolved and expanded 
dramatically. These days, investment banks are involved with their original suggests, but they 
are also performing much more diversified activities. Investment banks mainly deal with 
companies and other large institutions, and they typically do not deal with retail customers 
apart from the provision of up market private banking services as noted earlier. 
2.1.3.2 The roles and basic functions of an investment bank
 
 
Though the spotlight has recently been put on the investment banks role in creating 
highly leveraged debt instruments, their primary function is still to help corporations to raise 
capital. Mishkin (2013) explained that when a company needs additional capital it can go 
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about raising it in two ways. The primary markets for securities are not well known to the 
public because the selling of securities to initial buyers often takes place behind closed doors. 
An important financial institution that assists in the initial sale of securities in the primary 
market is the investment bank. It does this by underwriting securities. It guarantees a price for 
a corporation‘s securities and then sells them to the public. The investment bank can sell 
equity in the company in the form of a stock offering, or they can offer advice on the issuance 
of debt, or bonds, by the company. In some cases, this issuance of equities or debt is placed 
privately, in other words the instruments are not offered in the open markets, but are rather 
sold to private individuals or companies. If this is the case, the investment bank often acts as a 
broker by bringing together the two involved parties. These private transactions include not 
only private equity investments and private debt placements, but also merchant banking 
services, strategic investments, and venture capital investments. Note that sometimes financial 
advisory and underwriting is referred to as investment banking to distinguish this from trading 
and other securities-related business. It is also important to remember that investment banks 
do not hold retail deposits and their liabilities are mainly securities and short-term wholesale 
financing. 
2.2 Non-bank financial institution 
2.2.1 The roles and basic functions of non-bank financial institution 
It is agreed that financial intermediation through nonbank channels provides some 
benefits, and hence can constitute a useful part of the financial system (FSB 2011a; Pozsar 
2010). A non-bank financial institution (NBFI) is a financial institution that does not have a 
full banking license or is not supervised by a national or international banking regulatory 
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agency. In the world‘s economy, nonbank finance also plays an important role in channeling 
funds from lender-savers to borrower-spenders. Carmichael (2002) states that NBFIs facilitate 
bank-related financial services, such as investment, risk pooling, contractual savings, and 
market brokering. Examples of these include insurance firms, pawn shops, cashier's check 
issues, check cashing locations, payday lending, currency exchanges, and microloan 
organizations.  
Non-bank financial institution offer most sorts of banking services, such as loans and 
credit facilities, private education funding, retirement planning, trading in money markets, 
underwriting stocks and shares, TFCs (Term Finance Certificate) and other obligations. These 
institutions also provide wealth management such as managing portfolios of stocks and shares, 
discounting services e.g. discounting of instruments and advice on merger and acquisition 
activities. The number of non-banking financial companies has expanded considerably in the 
last several years as venture capital companies, retail and industrial companies have entered 
the lending business. Non-bank institutions also frequently support investments in property 
and prepare feasibility, market or industry studies for companies. However, they are typically 
not allowed to take deposits from the general public and have to find other means of funding 
their operations such as issuing debt instruments. 
2.2.2 The regulation of non-bank financial institution 
These non-bank financial institutions are typically restricted from taking deposits from 
the public depending on the jurisdiction. Nonetheless, operations of these institutions are often 
still covered under a country's banking regulations. Regulation is needed to ensure consumers‘ 
confidence in the financial sector. According to Llewellyn (1999), the main reasons for 
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financial sector regulation are to ensure systemic stability, provide retail clients with 
protection; and protect consumers against monopolistic exploitation. 
2.3 The innovation of financial instruments  
According to Mishkin (2013), although banking institutions are still the most important 
financial institutions in the U.S. economy, in recent years the traditional banking business of 
making loans that are funded by deposits has been in decline. Some of this business has been 
replaced by the shadow banking system, in which bank lending has been replaced by lending 
via the securities markets. To understand how the banking industry has evolved over time, we 
must first understand the process of financial innovation, which has transformed the entire 
financial system. Like other industries, the financial industry is in business to earn profits by 
selling its products. If a soap company perceives that a need exists in the marketplace for a 
laundry detergent with fabric softener, it develops a product to fit the need. Similarly, to 
maximize their profits, financial institutions develop new products to satisfy their needs, as 
well as those of their customers. Starting in the 1960s, individuals and financial institutions 
operating in financial markets were confronted with drastic changes in the economic 
environment: Inflation and interest rates climbed sharply and became harder to predict, a 
situation that changed demand conditions in financial markets. The rapid advance in computer 
technology improved supply conditions. In addition, financial regulations became more 
burdensome. Financial institutions found that many of the old ways of doing business were no 
longer profitable; the financial services and products they had been offering to the public were 
not selling. Many financial intermediaries found that they were no longer able to acquire funds 
with their traditional financial instruments, and without these funds they would soon be out of 
business. To survive in the new economic environment, financial institutions had to research 
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and develop new products and services that would meet customer needs and prove profitable, 
a process referred o as financial engineering. In their case, necessity was the mother of 
innovation. 
2.3.1 Securitization 
   Today, however, the definition of securitization has taken on a more specific meaning. 
As stated by Lumpkin (1999, p. 1):― More recently, the term has been used to refer to so-
called ―structured finance,‖ the process by which (relatively) homogeneous, but illiquid, assets 
are pooled and repackaged, with security interests representing claims to the incoming cash 
flows and other economic benefits generated by the loan pool sold as securities to third-party 
investors.‖ Fabozzi (2008) presents a detailed definition of securitization; this definition 
encompasses the following characteristics: ―A securitization differs from these traditional 
forms of financing in several important ways. The key in a securitization is that the cash flow 
generated by the asset pool can be employed to support one or more securities that may be of 
higher credit quality than the company‘s secured debt. The higher credit quality of these 
securities is achieved by relying on the cash flow created by the pool of assets rather than on 
the payment promise of the borrowing firm, such cash flows having been isolated in a 
bankruptcy remote structure and ―credit enhanced‖ using several credit enhancement 
techniques‖. Moreover, in relying on the liquidation value of the collateral, the lender assumes 
that in a bankruptcy proceeding the distribution of assets will be based on the principle of 
absolute priority (i.e. secured lenders are repaid before unsecured lenders and equity investors 
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receive any proceeds). However, while this is the case in a liquidation of a corporation, the 
principle of absolute priority typically does not hold in a corporate reorganization.
1
  
2.3.2 Securities issued in a securitization 
       According to Fabozzi (2008), the SPV (special suggest vehicle) is structured as a 
bankruptcy-remote entity, thus insulating the transaction from the credit risk of the originator. 
The term used to describe the securities issued by the SPV in a securitization are referred to as 
asset-backed notes, asset-backed bonds, or asset-backed obligations. When the security is 
short-term commercial paper, it is referred to as asset-backed commercial paper (or ABCP). 
Asset-backed securities can have different credit exposure and based on the credit priority, 
securities are described as senior notes and junior notes (subordinated notes). In the prospectus 
for a securitization, the securities are referred to as certificates: pass-through certificates or 
pay-through certificates. The distinction between these two types of certificates is the nature of 
the claim that the certificate holder has on the cash flow generated by the asset pool. If the 
investor has a direct claim on all of the cash flow and the certificate holder has a proportionate 
share of the collateral‘s cash flow, the term pass-through certificate (or beneficial interest 
certificate) is used. When there are rules that are used to allocate the collateral‘s cash flow 
among different bond classes, the asset-backed securities are referred to as pay-through 
certificates. 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Meckling (1977) and Miller (1977). 
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2.3.3 Securitization Products 
      From Joseph (2011), securitized products represent a complicated sector of the fixed-
income market. These products are pools of financial assets. These are brought together to 
make a new security, which is then divided and sold to investors. Because the value and cash 
flows of the new asset are based on its underlying securities, these investments can be hard to 
analyze. 
2.3.3.1 Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) 
     According to the definition of Frank J. Fabozzi (2011), Mortgage-Backed Security is a 
type of asset-backed security that is secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages. These 
securities must also be grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by an accredited 
credit rating agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon payments. 
2.3.3.2 Asset-Backed Security (ABS) 
     An asset-backed security (ABS) is a security whose income payments and hence the 
value is derived from and collateralized (or "backed") by a specified pool of underlying assets. 
The pool of assets is typically a group of small and illiquid assets that are unable to be sold 
individually. 
2.3.3.3 Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
      The asset-backed Commercial paper is a short-term investment vehicle with a 
maturity that is typically between 90 and 180 days. The security itself is typically issued by a 
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bank or other financial institution. The notes are backed by physical assets such as trade 
receivables and are generally used for short-term financing needs. 
2.3.3.4 Pass-through Certificates (PTC) 
         Pass-through certificate (PTC) is an instrument that evidences the ownership of two 
or more equipment trust certificates. In other words, equipment trust certificates may be 
bundled into a pass-through structure as a means of diversifying the asset pool and increasing 
the size of the offering. The principal and interest payments on the equipment trust certificates 
are "passed through" to certificate holders. Pass through certificate is an instrument that 
signifies transfer of an interest in receivables in favor of the holder of the Pass through 
Certificate. 
2.3.3.5 Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
CDOs, or Collateralized Debt Obligations, are sophisticated financial tools that banks use 
to repackage individual loans into a product that can be sold to investors on the secondary 
market. These packages consist of auto loans, credit card debt, mortgages or corporate debt. 
They are called collateralized because the promised repayment of the loans is the collateral 
that gives the CDOs value. 
2.3.3.6 Repurchase agreements (Repos) 
Repurchase agreements it‘s a form of short-term borrowing for dealers in government 
securities. The dealer sells the government securities to investors, usually on an overnight 
basis, and buys them back the following day. For the party selling the security (and agreeing to 
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repurchase it in the future) it is a repo; for the party on the other end of the transaction, 
(buying the security and agreeing to sell in the future) it is a reverse repurchase agreement. 
2.4 Shadow Banking 
The current financial crisis has highlighted the growing importance of the shadow 
banking system, which grew out of the securitization of assets and the integration of banking 
with capital market developments. This trend has been most pronounced in the United States, 
but it has had a profound influence on the global financial system.  
There are numerous definitions of the shadow banking in the literature. The FSB (2013, p. 
5) broadly describes the shadow banking system‖… as the system of credit intermediation that 
investors entities and activities fully or partially outside the regular banking system, or non-
bank credit intermediation in short.” Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to the 
provision of financing outside of traditional Banking channels, Former Federal Reserve Chair 
Ben Bernanke (2012) provided a detailed definition: "Shadow banking, as usually defined, 
comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional 
banking functions--but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the traditional system 
of regulated depository institutions. Examples of important components of the shadow banking 
system include securitization vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, 
money market mutual funds, markets for repurchase agreements (repos), investment banks, 
and mortgage companies." There are many ways to provide financing outside the traditional 
banking channels. Structured finance and securitization, for examples, raise financing 
indirectly through the capital markets using special suggest entities (SPEs) such as asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and structured investment vehicles (commonly 
19 
 
known as SIVs).
2
 The term shadow banking also includes the provision of financing by 
finance companies, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, non-bank government-
sponsored enterprises, securities lenders, and investment banks. The term even includes the 
provision of financing by banks using non-traditional means. For example, banks sometimes 
create and derive fee income from SPEs, ABCP conduits, and SIVs. Banks are also important 
players in repo markets. 
2.4.1 The roles and functions of shadow banking 
Like regular banks, shadow banks provide credit and generally increase the liquidity of 
the financial sector. Unlike their more regulated competitors, they lack access to central bank 
funding or safety nets such as deposit insurance and debt guarantees.
3
Contrast to traditional 
banks, shadow banks does not take deposits. Instead, they rely on short-term funding provided 
either by asset-backed commercial paper or by the repo market, in which borrowers in 
substance offer collateral as security against a cash loan, through the mechanism of selling the 
security to a lender and agreeing to repurchase it at an agreed time in the future for an agreed 
price. Michelle Martin(2012) state that money market funds do not rely on short-term funding; 
rather, they are investment pools that provide short-term funding by investing in short-term 
debt instruments issued by banks, corporations, state and local governments, and other 
borrowers. The shadow banking sector operates across the American, European, and Chinese 
financial sectors, According to Bouvert (2011), shadow banks can be involved in the provision 
of long-term loans like mortgages, facilitating credit across the financial system by matching 
investors and borrowers individually or by becoming part of a chain involving numerous 
                                                          
2
 For an introduction to structured finance and securitization in the context of China, see Schwarcz (2012) 
3
  Compare the difference  business of traditional bank and shadow bank, see Hall (2009) 
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entities, some of which may be mainstream banks.IMF (2013) defines the two key functions of 
the shadow banking system as securitization – to create safe assets, and collateral 
intermediation – to help reduce counterparty risks and facilitate secured transactions. As they 
are often less risk averse than regular banks, entities from the shadow banking system will 
sometimes provide loans to borrowers who might otherwise be refused credit. Money market 
funds are considered more risk averse than regular banks and thus lack this risk characteristic. 
2.4.2 The risks associated with shadow banking
 
As shadow banks do not take deposits, they are subject to less regulation than traditional 
banks. They therefore increase the rewards they get from investments by leveraging up much 
more than their mainstream counterparts and this can lead to risks mounting in the financial 
system. Unregulated shadow institutions can be used to circumvent the strictly regulated 
mainstream banking system and therefore avoid rules designed to prevent financial crises. 
At the same time, shadow banking activities can be an important source of systemic risk. 
After all, the global financial crisis originated in the shadow banking sector in 2008. Since 
then, there has been growing recognition that despite the beneficial role it can play in 
providing credit, the shadow banking system may pose even greater systemic risk than 
traditional banking, because its activities are exposed to similar financial risks as traditional 
banks, but are not subject to the same degree of oversight and regulation (IMF, 2014). 
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2.4.2.1 The potential for excess leverage
4
 
These risks include the potential for excess leverage. Activities in the shadow banking 
system can be highly leveraged, including through securities financing transactions (SFTs) 
that entail a temporary transfer of securities by a lender to a borrower on a collateralized basis. 
SFTs include both repo markets (in which commercial banks also participate) and securities 
lending transactions. The use of such nondeposit sources of collateralized funding can 
facilitate high levels of leverage since these assets can be used as collateral to raise more funds, 
which can then be used to buy more assets that in turn can be used as collateral to raise more 
funds (hence amplifying procyclicality). The practice that allows a prime broker to use 
collateral posted by, say, a hedge fund, for its own funding (rehypothecation) plays an 
important role in shadow banking, increasing the estimated size of the system prior to the 
crisis to at least 50 percent larger than had been previously documented (Singh and Aitken 
2010). A defined set of customer protection rules that limit rehypothecation of assets may not 
exist in all countries. 
2.4.2.2 Amplification of procyclicality 
As noted above, practices in the shadow banking system also amplify procyclicality-that 
is the mutually reinforcing interactions between the financial and real sectors of the economy 
that tend to exacerbate business cycle fluctuations and financial sector instability. 
Procyclicality can arise as a result of valuation changes in collateral assets can cause 
                                                          
4
 The World bank.,2012. Chasing the Shadows: How Significant Is Shadow Banking inEmerging Markets? 
[online database]. [cit 24.1.2015]. Available from internet: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP88.pdf 
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procyclicality.Rising collateral asset values increase cash/securities lent and, because the value 
of collateral assets is positively correlated with the business cycle, rising collateral values 
increase the credit availability (Credit Swiss, 2014). 
2.4.2.3 Transmission of systemic risk 
Shadow banking activities are often linked to the regular banking system through a 
complex web of interconnections. Turner (2012) presents commercial banks are often part of 
the shadow banking chain, or provide explicit or implicit support to the shadow banking 
entities to enable maturity/liquidity transformation. Also, banks often invest in financial 
products of shadow banks, alongside other providers of funds, such as consumers and 
corporations. The failure of an institution in the shadow banking sector could then generate 
significant contagion and affect the overall financial system stability. These bank–nonbank 
linkages can also exacerbate the procyclical buildup of leverage discussed above, involve 
―flawed credit risk transfers‖ through securitization and heighten risks of asset bubbles, 
especially when both systems invest in the same assets. Hence, even in cases where there is no 
direct connection; banks can be exposed to common concentrations of risks in financial 
markets through common holdings of assets and derivative positions (FSB, 2013). 
2.4.2.4 Regulatory arbitrage and circumvention 
Shadow banking activities could be used to circumvent the tighter regulations imposed on 
banking institutions. Provided that shadow banks are not subject to a similar set of regulations 
and oversight, the tightening of the regulation of risky banking activities could push such 
activities from the regulated banking system toward less- or unregulated shadow banks, and 
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could even generate systemically important nonbank financial institutions. Effectiveness of 
regulation to reduce systemic risk and leverage is hence undermined by the shadow banking 
system, leaving risks intact (or even greater) in the broader financial system, especially when 
the two parts of the financial system remain connected through ownership or financial 
linkages (FSB, 2014). 
2.5 Revision of the chapter 
            In this chapter, firstly, we illustrated the overall theoretical background of the 
banking system that is the central bank, commercial bank and investment bank respectively. 
As for each participates in the banking system, we demonstrate their objectives and functions. 
The non-banking financial institution is absolutely another very significant role in the financial 
market. We then introduced the roles and functions of the non-banking financial institution. 
As a non-bank financial institution (NBFI) is a financial institution that does not have a full 
banking license or is not supervised by a national or international banking regulatory agency. 
We then explained the necessity of the regulation of NBFI. Then we introduced the 
securitization, firstly we emphasize the motivation of securitization, the securities issued in 
securitization, and we specifically explained several securitization products. Since the 
tremendous development of securitization have been take place in the past decade in the world. 
It is one of the very vital factors that contribute to the shadow banking. We first introduce the 
definitions of the shadow banking and then we points out the risks associated with the shadow 
banking system. And it will be extremely urgent to regulate the shadow banking system. We 
will highly emphasize the regulation of shadow banking system in chapter 4 of this thesis.  We 
then will begin the Chapter 3 which is the difference of the shadow banking system between 
24 
 
China and US, the biggest two economy in the world, both are facing the rising of risk of 
shadow banking system. 
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3 The Shadow Banking System in China and US 
Shadow banking sector posed great influence to the world financial markets last decade. 
The circumstance of shadow banking finance in the United States and China – the two biggest 
economies in the world, are both very critical. As the shadow banking activity used to be 
weekly regulated, and the growth of the sector is thought to threaten financial stability. 
Therefore, additional regulations are necessary for both these countries. It is also important to 
monitor and measure their financial activities. For the US, the shadow banking industry is 
large and an increasingly integral part of the financial sector. For China, regulations on 
shadow finance are helping to curb potential the bad behaviour. But as a result of the fast 
growing of new and unregulated instruments or aspects of the informal financial sector may 
present a problem. The Chinese economy is extremely difficult to regulate but essential to 
control, particularly since it is closely interconnected with the rest of the world economy. This 
chapter contains a comparison of the shadow banking system in China and the United States, 
including different definition, size, causes, the potential risks and the possible regulations to 
the risks. 
3.1 The definition of shadow banking system for China and US 
Chinese regulators have not given a formal definition of shadow banking so far. There 
are numerous definitions of the shadow banking by some institutions and experts. So the 
regulators appear to follow the relatively more official definition of the shadow banking 
system in China. For example, the chairman of the board of directors of bank of China Xiao 
Gang (2012, p.1) put forward a definition: “shadow banking can broadly be described as the 
system of credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking 
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system”. Where in Chapter two there are many ways of providing financing outside of 
traditional banking channels. Structured finance and securitization, for example, raise 
financing indirectly through the capital markets using special suggest entities (―SPEs‖ 
conduits and structured investment vehicles (commonly known as SIVs) have been described 
in previous chapter. And we have already stated the basic definition of the shadow banking 
system in the Unites States (Schwarcz, 2012). 
3.2 The rationale for the rapid expansion of China’s shadow banking 
The main causes behind the increasing shadow banking and regulatory arbitrage in China 
can be traced back into two aspects. On the one side, regulatory policy measures in the 
traditional banking system are very restrictive. So there are many companies that wish to 
borrow, but cannot get access to traditional bank loans. Thus, they have to find the alternative 
way to borrow. On the other side, the demands for private credit are becoming stronger. The 
saving ratio in China used to be very high, but because of by keeping interest rates artificially 
low; the authorities push savers to seek higher returns outside the traditional banking system 
(Linden, 2013). 
3.3 Financiers in shadow banking system 
From the viewpoint of procuring funds, According to Schwarcz (2013), Chinese-style 
shadow banks can primarily be attributed to the rise of real estate developers, local financing 
platform and strong SME financing needs since 2010. The Chinese government's macro-
control of the direction of change, to a certain extent, was causing the real economic situation 
of relative shortage of funds. There are some industries that have been regulated more, for 
example, industries like real estate, local financing platform, as well as small and medium 
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private enterprises are been posed to more seriously funding gap, which greatly spawned the 
development of shadow banks. Shadow banking is increasingly important in China, especially 
as a source of funding to small and medium-sized enterprises (―SME‖s), including 
entrepreneurial start-up companies. This trend may reflect the unintended consequence of the 
Chinese regulatory policy. Chinese banking law limits bank-loan profits to percentages of the 
loan,
5
 which makes small and medium-sized loans much less attractive than large loans. SMEs, 
therefore, must seek other financing sources. Chinese real estate prices rose rapidly during the 
second half of 2009 to the first half of 2010, which led to the Chinese government to 
implement the restriction order which is characterized by a new round of macro-control of the 
real estate industry at the beginning of 2010. There is currently a considerable debate among 
Chinese stakeholders about the pros and cons of shadow banking. Proponents of more shadow 
banking stress the increasing economic efficiency through disintermediation, i.e. providing 
financing outside of traditional banking channels, and diversification of the provision of 
financial products and services. The emergence of shadow banks is an inevitable result of 
financial development and innovation. As a complement to the traditional banking system, 
shadow banks play an active role in serving the real economy and enriching investment 
channels for ordinary citizens. The shift from indirect to more direct finance will improve the 
efficiency of fund use, and well-conceived and balanced financial reforms have maximized the 
benefits of shadow banking while controlling the risks involved. However, some critics argue 
that shadow banking is not properly regulated, and its size and rapid growth does raise debt 
levels and make credit flows less transparent and riskier. In the current situation, there is still a 
key role for the government in the allocation of investments. Lending and deposit interest rates 
                                                          
5
 See for example Michael F. Martin (2012). 
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remain regulated and lending quotas are set by the government via strict loan/deposit ratio 
requirements. This system is widely perceived to have channeled huge capital flows to large 
and inefficient Stated owned enterprises in key industries such as energy, transportation, and 
infrastructure, many of which are facing significant overcapacity while causing difficulties for 
SMEs. It has become more apparent that this high level of lending to the state owned 
enterprise is beginning to deliver diminishing returns (The World Bank, 2012). 
3.3.1 Wealth management products (WMPs) 
            A bank‘s wealth management product refers to the fund investment and 
management program that is designed for and sold by a commercial bank to specific target 
customers after analyzing customers groups (China Merchants Bank, 2015). Usually, they are 
four kinds of wealth management products that are principal-protected, non-principal-
protected, estimated fixed -yield and estimated floating-yield. They are three steps for 
purchasing WMPs. The first step is that the investor should get to know the risks do exist, the 
level of which depends on the investment object of the corresponding product before buying. 
The second step is to select bank wealth management products. Investors need to understand 
the features of a product before buy it; for example, investors need to know whether the 
investment or linked object corresponds to the money market, bonds, trust loans, gold, the 
petroleum price, stock indices or foreign funds. They should select investment objects that you 
are familiar with so they fully understand the related risks and returns. The last step is to read 
the term sheet and especially understand the risk warning. If the investor has any questions, 
they should consult the customer service for wealth management of the bank. 
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The recent emergence of WMPs is driven by investors‘ request for higher yield. Issuance 
of WMPs has been a major source of funding that has fueled the rise in shadow banking credit. 
(The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2013) In post crises years, higher yield 
alternative investment like wealth management products has become increasingly attractive 
for deposits. That was caused by the real deposit rate has been negative for than half of the 
time in post-crises years.  
Figure 3.1: The lending cycle of a wealth management product 
 
Source: (Thomson Reuters, 2014) 
From the Figure 3.1, we can clearly see the lending process of Chinese commercial 
banks‘ lending cycle of WMPs. In the beginning, investors are investing their money to 
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WMPs issued via a bank. Then the funds get transferred to a trust company. Because of the 
huge finance demand of the manufacturing company, so the trust company can lend the money 
out to a real estate company for instance. At the end, when the real estate company gets the 
fund by a trust company and make a profit. The real estate company can either save the money 
in a bank or purchase WMPs issued by the commercial bank. 
3.3.2 The reason why Wealth management products (WMPs) develop rapidly 
WMPs are issued and sold by commercial banks; they represent the expansion of their 
traditional deposit businesses, and the provision of new investment products in line with 
practice in other markets. WMPs are more an example of financial innovation rather than 
regulatory arbitrage. This distinction reflects the debate as to whether the shadow banking 
sector should be seen as inherently risky regulatory arbitrage or an innovative stimulus to 
financial reforms that also serve real needs of both investors and businesses (Summers, 2013). 
WMPs are typically short-term with an average maturity of four months and are sold mostly 
via banks and offer investors a return of around 2% above bank deposits. 
WMPs have been a major source of funding that has fueled the rise in shadow banking 
credit. WMPs are usually of short maturity therefore banks have the flexibility to move assets 
and liabilities on- and off-balance-sheet by choosing the start-and end-dates of WMPs so they 
will maintain a low average deposit balance to avoid high reserve requirements. WMPs have 
been the major source of funding, and as WMPs are rolled over at short-term intervals, more 
and more new issuances are needed to pay off the expiring ones. A vicious cycle has 
developed, sparking growth in shadow banking activities and rendering these types of 
investments highly vulnerable to a sudden shortage of funds. 
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Figure 3.2: China deposit interest rate, 2008-2014 (in %) 
 
Source: National bureau of statistics of China (2015) 
From the Figure 3.2, we will know that the nominal deposit rate in China during the 
period 2008-2014, it reflects the interest rate that households receive on their savings in banks 
and rural credit cooperatives. We have to emphasize that this rate jumped shapely from 0.36 
percent to 0.5 percent in the year 2010. While it decreases to 0.35 percent one year later. The 
low deposit interest rate is the reason makes people readjust their investment plan; they would 
like to purchase higher yield WMPs rather than deposit their money in the bank. 
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Figure 3.3: China inflation rate, 2008-2014 (in %) 
 
Source: People‘s bank of China (2015) 
Figure 3.3 shows us the evolution of China‘s inflation rate from 2008 to 2014, because of 
the world financial crises in 2009, China‘s inflation rate decreased to minus two percent 
around the year in 2009 as a result of economy recession. While after 2012, the inflation rate 
in China remains stable around two percent. But with the China‘s economy growth slowdown 
and the cheap oil price, there are a huge amount of concerns that China will face deflation 
problem like what had happened in Japan and Europe. Combined the Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, 
we will know the real deposit rate in China in these five years. Real deposit rates were 
negative for more than half of the time in post-crisis years. Consequently, higher-yielding 
alternative investments like WMPs have become increasingly attractive for depositors. 
3.4 Investors in shadow banking system 
As for the investors for Chinese shadow banking system that is primary Chinese citizens, 
it contains the enterprise and financial institutions as well. As result of the rise and 
development of the shadow banking system, it provides a new investment vehicle as a 
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supplement of the traditional investment channels such as bank deposits, shares, real estate 
investment and foreign exchange investment. More importantly, the yield of the shadow 
banking product is much higher than the benchmark bank deposit rates. That will attract 
investors to allocate more of their money to the shadow banking products. This is, in fact, 
endogenous market interest rate liberation behaviour, breaking the financial repression aiming 
at the cap of benchmark bank interest rate. This will help the Chinese residence to diversity 
their assets allocation. Compared with stocks, real estate, foreign exchange and other risky 
assets, financial products and trust products and other shadow banking products usually have 
various types of warranties, so the risk is relatively controllable. In other words, China's 
shadow banking products as primary asset securitization products In fact connecting the 
Chinese money market, credit and bond markets together, which not only promote the 
development of financial mark From the perspective of financial institutions that serve as the 
intermediaries for funds, shadow banking is a way to circumvent regulations through financial 
innovation. As market competition has intensified, banks have come to use shadow banking as 
a tool for expanding lending in lieu of traditional channels in order to avoid regulations 
(RIETI, 2013), but also for the household sector to provide a more diversified investment 
options.  
3.5 Trust companies 
3.5.1 Defining “trust” and “trust property” 
      According to the Article 2 of the Trust Law defines ―trust‖ as follows: ―For the 
purposes of this Law, trust refers to the fact that the settler, based on his faith in the trustee, 
entrusts his property rights to the trustee and allows the trustee to, according to the will of the 
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settler and in the name of the trustee, administer or dispose of such property in the interest of a 
beneficiary or for any intended purposes.‖ Article 16 of the Rules Governing Trust Companies 
lists various types of trust business, including the following: (1) the entrusted management of 
cash, (2) the entrusted management of movable property, (3) the entrusted management of real 
estate, and (4) the entrusted management of securities. In addition, regarding the 
aforementioned administration or disposal of trust property, Neftci (2006) states that trust 
company is a legal entity that acts as fiduciary, agent or trustee on behalf of a person or 
business entity for the purpose of administration, management and the eventual transfer of 
assets to a beneficial party. The entity acts as a custodian for trusts, estates, custodial 
arrangements, asset management, stock transfer, beneficial ownership registration and other 
related arrangements. A trust company does not own the assets its customers assign to its 
management, but it may assume some legal obligation to take care of assets on behalf of other 
parties. Shadow banking credit in China is often extended through trust companies, the largest 
group of nonbank institutions in China as measured by total assets. (The Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco, 2013) Trust companies engage in a wide range of businesses including 
lending, asset management, real estate investment, and private equity investment. It was used 
to be called trust investment companies (TICs) before 2007, which plays a specialized role in 
credit extension to private enterprise. Because of the trust investment companies were used to 
be less regulated, it motivated the local government to take advantage of TICs to finance long-
term, risky real estate and infrastructure projects, which led to a rapid deterioration of TICs‘ 
asset quality in the early 1990s when the economy experienced a downturn. The trust sector 
subsequently experienced several dramatic booms and busts, followed each time by aggressive 
regulatory steps to clean up problem assets and improve risk management.  
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Table 3.1: Components of Shadow Banking System in China in 2012 
Components Percent 
Trust 21% 
Wealth Management Products 20% 
Entrust Loans 16% 
Bank Acceptance 16% 
Pawn shops 1% 
Brokerage firms 3% 
Guarantor 3% 
Small Lenders 2% 
Finance companies 9% 
Finance Leasing 2% 
Underground Lending 7% 
Estimated total size of shadow banking 
system  
RMB36 Trillion 
Sources: PBOC, CBRC (2012) 
We can see from the Table 3.1 that Trust companies are the most important component of 
the Chinese shadow banking sector. They finance riskier borrowers and transactions that 
banks cannot undertake due to regulations. In 2012, according to the people‘s bank of China‘s 
estimation, that trust companies account for 21% of shadow banking system in China. Wealth 
management products are the other important components that account for 20%. As the local 
governments are prohibited to take on credit on their account, they set up platform companies, 
commonly referred to as LGFVs (Local Government Financing Vehicles), to finance their 
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investment activities in the form of bank credit. The WMPs and TPs (Trust products), sold by 
banks and trust companies respectively, comprise the core of shadow banking products. Banks 
and trust companies, most of which are state-owned, are under the jurisdiction of the PBC and 
the CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission), so the sales of WMPs and TPs are also 
subjected to their supervision. 
3.6 The Recent Financial Crisis and the Shadow Banking System in US 
The shadow banking system had been growing for some time prior to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 2007. The shadow banking system provided credit by issuing liquid, short-
term liabilities against risky, long-term, and often opaque assets. The funding of credit through 
the shadow banking system significantly reduced the cost of borrowing during the run-up to 
the financial crisis, at the expense of increasing the volatility of the cost of credit through the 
cycle. At the beginning of the recent financial crisis, the thought that the U.S. subprime 
mortgages triggered the crisis was widespread, because of the lack of understanding of the 
magnitude and architecture of the whole banking system crisis (regulated and unregulated side 
or traditional and shadow) 
3.6.1 The reason of the finance crises in 2007 
     The shadow banking system is responsible for the financial crises for some reasons. 
Firstly the collateralized debt obligations were created in the shadow banking system in US. 
the toxic securities that were at the epicenter of the crisis. Second, it was non-bank financial 
institutions, most notably hedge funds but also pension and mutual funds and insurance 
companies, which had causal primacy in the financial crisis. It was primarily these institutions 
that forced the accelerated rate of production of CDOs to a scale of sufficient proportions as to 
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be able to cause the money markets to go into cardiac arrest on August 9th, 2007. (FESSUD, 
2012) 
3.6.2 The shadow banking system in outline in US 
   In China, WMPs and trust products are the major participate role contributes to the 
shadow banking finance. US shadow banking system is mainly caused by the financial 
innovation and securitization. 
Table 3.2: Outline of the Commercial Bank-Shadow Bank Nexus at the Time of the Sub-
Prime Crisis   
On Balance Sheet Banking: Regulated 
Capital -
money 
Markets 
Sellers: Governments, Other Banks, Non-bank Financial Institutions 
Securities 
Buyers 
Banks Assets: Cash, T-bills, T-bonds, Securities, Mortgages Loans, Credit Loans 
Liabilities: Share, Capital, Money, Borrowing, Bond Issues, Deposits 
Capital -
money 
Markets 
Sellers 
Securities 
Buyers: Asset Managers, Money Market Funds, Cooperate Treasures 
Source: FESSUD, (2012) 
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Off Balance Sheet Banking: Unregulated 
Banks Sellers of Loans 
Shadow 
Banking 
Entities 
Assets: 1) SPEs: Conforming Loans, Non- conforming Loans. 2) SIVs: ABS 
3) Conduits: ABS, CDOs 
Liabilities: 1) SPEs: ABS, ABCP, Other Money Market Funding. 2) SIVs: 
CDOs, ABCP, Other Money Market Funding. 3) Conduits: ABCP 
Capital -
money 
Markets 
Buyers of Securities: Asset Managers, Other Shadow Bank Entities, Money 
Market Funds, Cooperate Treasures 
Source: FESSUD, (2012)  
In the Table 3.2, it is the comparison of the on balance sheet banking which is regulated 
and the off balance sheet banking which is unregulated. We can see that on the asset side of 
banks‘ balance sheets the capital and money markets represent important sources of securities 
needed by the banks while on the liability side of banks‘ balance sheets these same markets 
represent important sources of demand for securities issued by the banks. However, the 
relation of mutual dependence between these sectors here is not one that subverts the clear 
distinction between the different types of activities taking place in them. By contrast, this is 
the case in the shadow banking realm where the capital and money markets are indispensable 
to the credit intermediation and maturity transformation functions performed by the special 
suggest entities (SPEs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits. These three major 
types of off-balance sheet vehicles operating at the time of the subprime crisis constituted the 
central medium through which the basic banking activities of taking deposits and extending 
loans on one side of the equation were indissolubly mixed together with the basic capital and 
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money activities of buying and selling securities on the other. The reality, as we see it, is that 
only the SPEs, SIVs and conduits constituted the core of the shadow banking system because 
only these three entities were the production factories supplying credit-based securities 
(Lysandrou, 2012) 
3.7 The estimation of the size of the China’s shadow banking system 
China‘s shadow financial system is comprised of non-bank financial products, including 
bank trust cooperation financial products, products issued by trust companies and financial 
leasing companies and credit risk assets. Small loan companies, investment companies, credit 
guarantee companies, insurance brokerage firms, pawn shops, private equity investment funds, 
and venture capital funds are the major credit creation products. The shadow financial system 
is dominated by commercial banks (in off balance sheet transactions), insurance companies, 
and trusts. The shadow banking system is dominated by commercial banks (in off balance 
sheet transactions), insurance companies and trusts. Although the Chinese shadow banking 
system includes informal financing, we disregard this sector in this thesis because it is highly 
heterogeneous and relatively low-risk (Li, 2013). 
The shadow banking system has grown rapidly in recent years. Supervision currently 
focuses on commercial banks, while attention is not given to property securities and other non-
loan assets. Trust companies and security traders engage in activities that may be high-risk, 
with high returns as well. Below, we discuss some of the riskier shadow banking institutions, 
including commercial banks; trusts, and credit guarantee companies. 
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the size of China’s shadow banking system  
Source Data USD 
trillions 
RMB 
trillions 
% of bank 
assets *year 
end-2012 
% of 
2012 
GDP 
GF Securities 12/17/2012    4.8 30 31% 57% 
Citi Research 1/11/2013 4.5 28 29% 54% 
Barclays Dec. 2012 4.1 25.6 27% 49% 
Hua Tai 
Securities 
12/14/2012 4 25 26% 48% 
UBS 10/16/2012 2.2-3.9 13.7-24.4 14%-25% 26-46% 
ANZ Bank Dec. 2012 2.4-2.7 15-17 16%-18% 29-33% 
Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch 
7/6/2012 2.3 14.5 15% 28% 
*Total assets of large state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city 
commercial banks. 
Source: FSB (2012), World Economic Outlook (October 2012) 
Due to differences in the definition and treatment of double counting on shadow banking 
system, we can see from the Table 3.3 that the estimation of the size of shadow banking assets 
in China ranges widely. The figure showed us in 2012, to summaries all these estimation, that 
RMB 30 trillion (USD 4.8 trillion) seems to be a reliable upper bound. This amounts to 57 
percent of GDP or 31 percent of bank assets. Putting these numbers in perspective, the FSB 
estimated that shadow banking assets around the world reached USD 67 trillion in 2011, 
which is roughly equivalent to 111 percent of global GDP or half the size of banking system 
assets. 
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Table 3.4: Shadow banking assets as of 2011 
Country USD trillion % of 2011 GDP % of World GDP 
United States 23 152% 35% 
Euro area 22 168% 33% 
United Kingdom  9 370% 12% 
World total 67 111% 100% 
Sources: FSB (2012), World Economic Outlook (October 2012). 
In the Table3.4, we can compare the proportion of the shadow banking assets account to 
the GDP, shadow banking assets in United States and Euro areas are really large, (23 USD 
trillions and 22 USD trillions respectively). As for China‘s shadow banking assets to GDP 
ratio it is according to the Figure 3.6 that, the shadow banking assets to GDP ratio is 57% that 
is the maximum estimation. While comparing the shadow banking assets to GDP ratio to the 
developed economies in the world, this ratio is 152% in United States, 168% of Euro area, and 
370% in United Kingdom. 
3.8 Comparison between China and the US shadow banking system 
The reason of shadow banking system develops in China, and the US can both attribute to 
the demands for credit loans had been increasing in the past two decades. In western 
economies shadow banking generally refers to an investment management scheme, such as 
asset-backed commercial paper and structured investment vehicles, that employs excessive 
leverage to maintain margins by raising short-term funds and investing them in long-term 
assets (mostly in tax havens). Shadow banking can get involved in credit, period and liquidity 
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transformation, with a function of creating credit. With maturity mismatch, high leverage, 
sensitivity to asset price fluctuation and less supervision, it increases the systematic financial 
risks. 
     China‘s shadow banking is an inevitable result of financial innovation and has played an 
active role in broadening the investment channels for the Chinese private sector. The shadow 
banking system in China is a small scale at first when viewing from the composition and 
operation of shadow banking, characteristics of commercial banks can still be found in shadow 
banking institutions in China, engaging in deposit taking and loan granting. Only a few of 
them got involved in the securitization of real estate loans like shadow banking institutions. 
The Chinese shadow banking industry carries less complex financial instruments. Most of the 
financial products are either bond or belong to the first layer of loan securitization. For 
example, loan trusts could be viewed as so-called privately issued bonds therefore allowing 
banks to sell or package the loans into WMPs. The Chinese shadow banking is similar to the 
West in the sense that it serves the function of maturity transformation and has become a tool 
to avoid regulations and liquidity crises due to massive withdrawal of funds as the shadow 
banking system is not supported by the deposit insurance system or the discount window of 
the central bank. While in the US shadow banking evolved from formerly government-
sponsored securitization transactions that were utilized in order to enhance credit creation 
capacities for home mortgages. The US has well-developed shadow banking and capital 
market that includes a wide range of products that are far more complex in structure than those 
in China. Another significant parallel between both shadow banking systems relates to the 
interdependency between shadow and regulated banks through the utilization of off-balance 
sheet investment vehicles (e.g. trust companies) to evade regulatory constraints and to increase 
43 
 
income from lending activities. In both cases, regulatory arbitrages incentivize regular banks 
to increase credit origination capacities through transferring credit risk to third parties. The 
interconnection between the Chinese shadow and commercial banking sector is far greater if 
compared to the US, which operates mainly outside the boundaries of its financial market. 
Therefore, potential defaults are much less to worry about than in the Chinese system where 
defaults have a greater effect on the domestic financial market. 
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Table 3.5: The difference between China and US’s shadow banking system 
China‘s shadow banking 
 
US‘s shadow banking 
Domestic financial system Both domestic and foreign financial 
system 
Mainly driven by commercial banks Mainly driven by non-bank financial 
institutions 
Underdeveloped secondary market Well-developed secondary market 
Low securitization rate High securitization rate 
Low leverage rate High leverage rate 
Purchases made by individual 
investors 
Purchases made by institutional 
investors 
Immature development phase with 
inherent risks 
More mature development phase 
Irregular fund raising and lending 
operations 
More regular fund raising and lending 
operations 
Source: Linden (2013) 
As we can see from the Table 3.5, we generalize that the shadow banking system in 
China differs from the shadow banking system in US in several aspects. The American system 
is led by commercial banks through a relatively long and big sophisticated intermediation 
chain and has a relatively high securitization, and leverage rate and purchases are mostly made 
by institutional investors. By contrast, China lacks a market for secondary transfers of credit 
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assets which would allow efficient diversification of credit and liquidity risks. It is because 
limited credit supply to private companies and projects, as well as interest rate ceilings for 
bank depositors initially, motivated banks to intermediate alternative sources of funds thereby 
tapping into the shadow banking system (Zhang, 2013). 
3.9 Revision of the chapter 
In this chapter, we have compared the different features of the shadow banking system in 
China and the United States. And argue that these specialized financial intermediaries in each 
country play a critical role in the rising and growth of the shadow banking finance. Thus, it is 
necessary to enhance supervision to the financial system. The comparison of the shadow 
banking system between China and US are in a number of aspects. Firstly we state the 
different definition of the shadow banking system in each country. Then we analyze the reason 
shadow banking rose and developed on so rapidly in these two countries. As for the China‘s 
case, it can be attributed to financiers and investors that have been activity participated in the 
Chinese financial market. This is because of their huge demand of financing and investing. In 
terms of the reasons for US shadow banking system, it would contribute to its advanced 
financial system and the enormous financial innovation, for example, the fast growing and 
development of the financial derivative instruments such as (Mortgage Backed Securities, 
Collateralized Debt Obligation). But since the subprime crisis took place in 2007, the risk has 
exploded and spread to the whole world very rapidly. And we will go further to the risk and 
regulation in the chapter four. Finally, we made the Table 3.5 which demonstrates the 
similarities and differences between China and the US shadow banking system. In conclusion, 
shadow banking systems are different in these two nations in several aspects. Firstly, the role 
of commercial bank plays in the whole financial system, secondly, the source and operation of 
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funds, the feature of risks type and the regulatory authorities. Thought the comparison of 
shadow banking in these two biggest economies, we will be clearer to understand the 
commons and the unique characteristics, and it is the benefit for us to analyze these financial 
institutions systematically and comprehensively. 
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4 Potential risks and regulations of the China’s shadow banking system 
In recent years, with the growing of bank wealth management products, trust products, 
and internet finance, these off- balance sheet financial products aggravate the shadow banking 
problem. The response of the Chinese government at the end of 2013 was to issue an internal 
directive to the country‘s monetary authorities and local governments to tighten the regulation 
of shadow banking, to assign regulators for shadow banking operations and individual 
financial institutions, and to create a comprehensive regulatory framework. In addition, the 
Chinese government has set a timetable with a deadline of 2018 for adopting the Basel III 
framework and is seeking to put bank balance sheets on a sounder footing. (Sekine, 2013) 
Ultimately, the problems need to be solved as part of the process of reforming China‘s 
financial markets and fostering the development of the country‘s securities and asset 
management industries. In this chapter, we will introduce all kind of shadow banking activity 
risks, and then we will introduce several indicators to identify the financial crisis, at the end, 
we will suggest some possible solutions with can enhance the regulation on shadow finance or 
minimize the potential  risk. 
4.1 Risks posed by bank wealth management products 
     The participants in China‘s domestic markets have frequently expressed views on the 
risks posed by bank wealth management products. For example, chairman of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission Xiao Gang (2013) state that:‖There are more than 20,000 
WMPs in circulation, a dramatic increase from only a few hundred just five years ago. Given 
that the number is so big and hard to manage, China’s shadow banking sector has become a 
potential source of systemic financial risk over the next few years. Particularly worrisome is 
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the quality and transparency of WMPs. Many assets underlying the products are dependent on 
some empty real estate property or long-term infrastructure, and are sometimes even linked to 
high-risk projects, which may find it impossible to generate sufficient cash flow to meet 
repayment obligations. China’s shadow banking is contributing to a growing liquidity risk in 
the financial markets. Most WMPs carry tenures of less than a year, with many being as short 
as weeks or even days. Thus in some cases short-term financing has been invested in long-
term projects, and in such situations there is a possibility of a liquidity crisis being triggered if 
the markets were to be abruptly squeezed.”  
4.1.1 Lack of transparency 
 According to China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (2014), as banks issue 
liquidity pool wealth management products, they usually do not disclose the detail information 
about the WMPs that they issued, such as investment ratios, risks, and profit/ loss during plan 
periods as well as investors‘ understanding of their investments. All this information will be 
disclosed inadequate and misleading. 
   Eiichi (2014) states that the use of liquidity pools by banks has led to bank deposits 
being converted into off-balance-sheet wealth management products which means the 
liabilities has been shifted off the balance sheet. For assets, as liquidity pool is being invested 
mainly wealth management products with no capital guarantee and a variable return are also 
being recorded off the balance sheet. So it means assets are also being shifted off the balance 
sheet. So there is a risk that the bank concerned may not have enough capital. If a bank that 
had failed to build up a sufficient capital base overinvested in high-risk assets, the capital 
needed to redeem those investments could overstretch the bank‘s risk management capability. 
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4.1.2 Liquidity risk by maturity mismatch of the WMPs 
In China, WMPs can be defined as collective investment schemes originated and 
marketed by banks. WMPs are treated different from bank deposits and regulated as retail 
financial products. (Eiichi, 2014) One of the distinctive features of wealth management 
products is their short maturity. From the liability side, due to the fierce competition of the 
deposit business among the commercial banks, leading to the shadow banking products exhibit 
short-term trend. From the assets side, in order to obtain higher yield, the capitals in the 
shadow banking system are approaching to the long-term projects. Above maturity mismatch 
means that to ensure the stability of the asset side in order to obtain a higher rate of return, 
shadow banks must rely on short-term financial products rolling release (issued new-old) to 
address maturity mismatches caused by periodic liquidity pressures. Once the old financial 
products expire, and new financial products cannot be released in full, then the shadow 
banking system have to go through the emergency sale of long-term security product to repay 
the principal plus interest. Thus, the shadow banking system will undoubtedly suffered large 
losses. 
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Table 4.1 Maturity structure of renminbi (Chinese currency) wealth management 
products (issue amount) in % 
Maturity structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Less than a month  2.6 1.7 13.7 24 31 36.6 4.91 4.01 
1-3 months 15.7 19.8 27.4 26.8 30 30.2 60.18 61.15 
3-6 months 35.4 23.2 26.1 22.5 18.1 18.9 21.87 20.75 
6-12 months 29.8 27.5 22 21 17.8 11.9 10.01 11.13 
1-2 years 14.3 18.8 5.5 3.3 2 1.5 0.98 1.08 
More than two 
years 
1.9 5.6 2.4 1,9 0.6 0.4 0.31 0.18 
N/A 0.3 3.3 2.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.74 1.69 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Shanghai Wind Information Co., Ltd, Chinese Academy of Social Science, CBRC 
(2013) 
From the Table 4.1, we can conclude from the statistics provided by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS) and China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), 
ultra-short-term wealth management products (i.e., those with a maturity of less than a month) 
accounted for 13.7% of the renminbi wealth management products issued in 2008 in terms of 
issue amount. This proportion increased to 24% in 2009, 31% in 2010, and 36.6% in 2011. 
While these numbers decrease dramatically in 2010, it turned to 4.91% in 2011 and 4.01 % in 
2012. Before 2012, the reason for the high proportion of the short-term maturity wealth 
management products is that the banks found themselves short of cash and were able to raise 
cash by issuing high-yielding wealth management products with short maturities despite loan-
to-deposit ratio limits. (Sekine, 2015). And after 2011, however, this sharp increase trend has 
reserved, until 2011 the banks would issue Ultra- Short- Term wealth management products 
with maturities of less than a month and record them as deposits on their books and then re-
enter them as wealth management products at the end of each month and each quarter in order 
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to stay within the loan-to-deposit ratio limits. While, in 2012, the monetary authority had 
restricted the issue of Ultra- Short- Term wealth management products, so the banks have to 
issue the wealth management products with 1-3 months maturity. (60.18% of the amount 
issued in 2012) and the sharp decrease in the issue of products with a maturity of less than a 
month (4.91% of the amount issued). This trend continued in 2013, with products with a 
maturity of 1–3 months accounting for 61.15% of the amount issued in the first half of the 
year and products with a maturity of less than a month accounting for 4.01%. 
Table 4.2 Asset structure of renminbi wealth management products (issue amount) 
Unit: percent 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Interest rate 
products 
60.78 42.74 40.4 37.02 55.27 54.32 62.81 58.12 
Portfolio Products 0.78 3.06 1.09 15.63 31.47 37.64 33.21 36.31 
Loan Products 22.82 20.21 49.94 42.83 10.81 5.69 0.52 2.38 
Forex Products 6.12 1.11 0.75 0.92 0.72 1.12 1.89 0.07 
Equity Products 7.92 30.63 5.46 2.8 1.37 0.97 1.05 2.18 
Commodity 
Products 
1.57 2.25 2.36 0.8 0.35 0.27 0.52 0.31 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Shanghai Wind Information Co., Ltd, Chinese Academy of Social Science, CBRC 
(2014) 
     According to the Table 4.2, Chinese Academy of Social Science (2013) gives a 
breakdown of the assets in which renminbi wealth management products which are interest 
rate products, portfolio products, loan products, forex products, equity products, and 
commodity products. At first, we have to emphasize the fluctuation process of the loan 
products; in 2008, the loan products accounted for 49.94 % of the total renminbi WMPs. But 
after three years, its proportion is smaller than 1 % that is only 0.52%. This is because the 
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temporary increase to circumvent aggregate limits imposed on bank lending and subsequent 
rapid decline in issuance as a result of tighter regulation. Banks have originated portfolio 
products to raise cash by combining assets subject to a variety of different risks. As the money 
raised by issuing wealth management products is paid into a liquidity pool, it has been argued 
that these products are similar to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). However, the two 
types of products differ in two respects. First, in the case of portfolio products, the source of 
the liquidity is not isolated from the underlying assets. As a result, any interruption to the cash 
flow from the investment assets inevitably poses a liquidity risk. Second, multiple wealth 
management products are not used to create overlapping layers of collateral, and the degree of 
leverage is relatively small (Eiichi, 2014)  
4.2 Risks posed by Trust products 
   Trust companies engage in a wide range of businesses including lending, asset 
management, real estate investment, and private equity investment. Before 2007, trust 
companies were known as trust investment companies (TICs) and specialized in credit 
extension to private enterprises. Local governments also used lightly regulated TICs to finance 
long-term, risky real estate and infrastructure projects, which led to a rapid deterioration of 
TICs‘ asset quality in the early 1990s when the economy experienced a downturn (Li, 2013). 
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Figure 4.1 Chinese trust assets outstanding and rate of growth (quarter to quarter) unit: 
(RMB100mn) 
 
Source: China Trustee Association (2014) 
The Figure 4.1 illustrates that according to the estimation of Nomura Institute of Capital 
Markets Research based on the China Trustee Association data, we can see the latest data in 
the end March 2014, the total amount of trust assets under management was close to RMB 
120,000 million. The total number of outstanding trust assets was just over 20,000 million in 
March 2010; it has increased almost 6 times within four years. And from the figure, we can 
understand that the total outstanding trust assets are continuous growing, but the growth rate 
are declining gradually when we see the trend of the quarter to quarter growth rate. And the 
growth rate is becoming stable after June 2013.  
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Table 4.3 Comparison between wealth management products and trust products 
  Tenor  Minimum 
investment 
Return  
Wealth management products  30 days to one 
year 
RMB50,000  4% to 6% 
  
Trust products  1 to 2 years RMB 1million 8% to 12% 
Source: Author‘s Composition by the available data 
   We have mentioned that wealth management products and trust products are the most 
important composition in China‘s shadow banking finance. From the Table 4.3, we can see in 
terms of the maturity, trust products are longer with the maturity 1 to 2 years, whereas only 30 
days to one year for wealth management products. And the minimum investments for trust 
products are much higher than wealth management products. So it can earn a high yield 
compared to the WMPs.  
4.3 Local Governments and the Shadow Banking  
   In present China, the local government bears the burden of providing various public 
services while their financing faces perpetual shortage mainly because of the tax sharing 
system 
6
and prohibition in principle of issuing bonds. (Kenji,2014) so this contribute to the 
rise of the so called ―local government financing vehicles (LGFVs)‖, which local governments 
established to finance real estate development and other infrastructural projects such as road 
                                                          
6
 Tax sharing system divides tax revenues into central tax, local tax and shared tax between central and local 
governments, depending on the tax items and tax payers. It was introduced to secure the revenues for the central 
government. 
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and railway construction.‖ The local government mainly makes use of the LGFVs to raise 
funds.  
Figure 4.2 China’s government debt outstanding and total government debt ratio to 
GDP     
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data of China‘s National Audit Office 
 According to the China‘s National Audit Office (NAO), we can see the Figure 4.2, the 
Chinese local government debt outstanding has increased substantially, the local government 
debt outstanding in 2008 was approximately 5 trillion RMB, while after four years in 2013, 
and it has grown to more than 35 trillion RMB. In contrast, the central government debt 
outstanding in recent years has experienced the decline. But, in general, the total government 
debt has been increasing fast. Compare the data of total government debt in 2013 and 2008, it 
was approximately 10 Trillion RMB while, in 2013, it was around 30 Trillion RMB.  The 
entire government outstanding has increased three times. The total debt to GDP ratio has 
increased from 35% in 2008 to around 55% in 2013. The rate reached its highest point in 2012; 
the total government debt has accounted for almost 60% of GDP. 
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Figure 4.3 General Scheme of a LGFV 
 
Note:(→indicates the flow of money） 
Source：Author‘s Composition 
   As the Figure 4.3 showed, we made the general scheme of the relationship of the local 
government financing vehicles (LGFVs); we can see the local governments investing in local 
government financing vehicles, and then LGFVs will issue bonds to individual investors to get 
money. Conversely, the individual investors will sell the bank‘s wealth management products 
to LGFVs. Then if the local infrastructure projects need to be funded, it will be invested by 
LGFVs. A lot of bank WMPs are invested in these LGFV bonds. Reportedly banks are 
investing their lion‘s share of money in the lower rated LGFV bonds to secure higher profits, 
revealing the structure where the money of individual investors supports the LGFVs. 
Furthermore, in the so-called ―bank-trust cooperation model‟, banks channel funds to trusts 
via entrusted loans; trusts make high-yield loans to risky or small borrowers that have 
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difficulty directly obtaining bank credit. By engaging in this type of cooperation, banks can 
―outsource‟ part of their lending business to trust companies and move these loans off their 
balance sheets. 
4.4 China’s debt concern 
   Linden (2014) states that although the China‘s economic growth over the last decades 
has been spectacular; this growth has become increasingly dependent on debt creation. The 
increasing reliance on debt for growth is partly a consequence of the China‘s relatively low 
domestic consumption ratio which the State Council wants to rebalance as part of the last Five 
Year plan 2011-2015
7. The excess savings of China‘s households, private and public sectors 
are channeled into the SOBs (State Owned Banks) which lend it to finance domestic 
investments.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The rebalancing of China‘s economy includes not only lowering investment and increasing overall 
consumption but also scaling down the role of the state sector, reducing speculative investment in real 
estate, altering the way credit is allocated, and speeding growth of the services sector. An effective 
rebalancing of China‘s economy is aiming a more sustainable long-term growth with lower short-term 
growth as a result. 
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Figure 4.4 China’s debt development from 2007 to 2012 (in % of GDP)  
 
Source: PBOC (2014) 
From the Figure 4.4, we will see the China‘s debt development from 2007 to 2012. The 
central government debt has increased from 147% of GDP in 2008 to more than 250% of GDP 
in 2014, so especially the fast increase of this debt in such a short time is worrisome since in 
other economies this often led to a financial collapse. The question is to what extent China‘s 
private debt-to-GDP ratio can continue to raise taking into account that more investments are 
made in non-productive projects, and more debt is being used to repay old debts. Domestic 
shadow lending is keeping increase that will destabilize the financial system. 
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4.5 Rise of Internet finance 
4.5.1 Internet Finance in China 
The development of Internet finance has not only taken advantage of modern information 
technology but also improved the quality, quantity, and efficiency of financial services, 
reduced the cost of financial transactions, and made it easier for SMEs and microenterprises to 
borrow. The rise of internet finance has draw people‘s attention; acting as a new type of 
shadow banking has emerged that has slipped through the regulation. Zhang (2013) 
distinguishes three different types of Internet finance in China. The first is Internet lending, 
otherwise known as P2P (peer-to-peer lending) social finance, the leading providers of this 
service in China include companies such as Yixin, Renrendai, and PaiPaiDAI. The second is 
Internet wealth management. This business, whether conducted by a traditional financial 
institution or an Internet company, involves issuing wealth management products on the 
Internet, investing the money raised, and using the return on the investment to pay principal 
and interest to the investors in the wealth management products. One of the leading providers 
of this service is the Yuebao platform of Internet giant Alibaba. The third is Internet payment 
and settlement. This service involves using the Internet as a third-party payment platform to 
provide payment and settlement services to Internet shopping customers. One of the leading 
providers of this service is Alibaba‘s Zhifubao platform. Of these providers, however, it is 
Yu‘ebao that has caused a stir among market participants and is at the center of the debate on 
the future of Internet finance in China (Zhang, 2013) 
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Figure 4.5 Schematic diagram of how surplus cash invested via Yu’e bao 
 
Source：Author‘s Composition 
It is clear to see from the Figure 4.5 the schemes of how the surplus cash invested via 
Yu‘e bao. The basic process is that at first consumers agree to signs the Yu‘e bao user 
agreement. Secondly, the consumers transfer their money from bank to Yu‘e bao account via 
their own Zhifubao.
8
 Because Yu‘e bao as a platform for investing surplus money, it can 
invest in the capital market as a money market fund. It can purchase Tianhong zenglibao 
automatically. And vise verse, when the money market fund ( Tianhong zeng libao) makes the 
profit, these profit will goes to the consumer‘s accounts finally. Since Yu‘e bao was launched 
in June 2013, the amount outstanding in user accounts has continued to increase. As a result, 
Tianhong Asset Management‘s assets under management have risen sharply to RMB197.9 
billion (as of the end of 2013), putting it in second place behind China Asset Management 
with RMB288.6 billion. As of end-February 2014, the amount outstanding in Yu‘e bao 
                                                          
8
 Zhifubao also called Alipay, is a third-party online payment platform with no transaction fees. Alipay has the 
biggest market share in China with 300 million users and control of just under half of China's online payment 
market in February 2014. 
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accounts was reported to have passed the RMB400 billion. Yu‘e bao is a very convenient, 
high-value-added service for users of Zhifubao and is essentially an innovative combination of 
a third-party payment service and a money market fund. Under the Yu‘e bao model, Zhifubao 
is not involved in marketing the fund; nor does it interfere in the fund‘s investment operations. 
All it does is act as a portal for customers. Yu‘e bao is a by-product of interest rate 
deregulation and the growth of the Internet in China. In order to ensure that Yu‘e bao and 
other Internet funds continue to develop steadily and in a healthy manner, the CSRC will 
require money market funds to improve their risk management and is currently devising rules 
for regulating funds sold on the Internet (Eiichi, 2014) 
4.5.2 Rapid growth of money market funds 
   Tianhong zenglibao is one of the money market funds in China, when we take a look at 
the Chinese market for money market funds as a whole. The value has increased significantly. 
The rapid growth of Yu‘e bao has been matched by outflows from bank deposits, and the 
platform has been seen as posing a threat to smaller banks, in particular. Another point to bear 
in mind is that Yu‘e bao invests in the money (interbank) market, where most of the activity is 
in bonds (bank debentures) and ultra-short-term negotiated deposits, and that it has taken 
advantage of the interest rate rises in that market. What this means for banks is that money is 
flowing out of their ordinary savings accounts only to reappear (via Yu‘e bao) on their balance 
sheets as a liability, namely in the form of high-interest-rate negotiated deposits. There have 
therefore been increasing calls from the banks for tighter controls on internet finance. On the 
other hand, there have been calls from securities companies, mindful of the liquidity money 
market funds add to the money market and the role they have played in anticipating the 
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deregulation of interest rates, to allow them to continue to develop, subject to proper risk 
management. (Eiichi, 2014) 
4.5.3 Regulatory policy on Internet finance and money market funds 
   China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has voiced its views on how Internet 
finance should be regulated. On 14 and 28 February 2014, CSRC had made the comments on 
internet finance and money market funds. The recent report states that although the 
development of internet finance has made the breakthrough in the traditional banking system, 
and it has lots of advantages. But Internet finance is essentially still finance. Therefore, it 
needs to comply with the financial rules and regulations currently in force. At the same time, 
there are some non-traditional aspects of Internet finance, and these must also be regulated. 
And the People‘s bank of China (PBOC) sets out its plans to introduce a system of regulating 
Internet finance in order to support its sound development. First, innovations in Internet 
finance must be based on the fundamental principle of providing a financial service to the real 
economy, and their limitations and level must be properly understood. Second, innovations in 
Internet finance must be subject to the overall requirements of macro-prudential controls and 
financial stability. Third, consumers‘ legal rights must be safeguarded. Fourth, the market 
must remain a level playing field. Fifth, a proper balance must be struck between government 
regulation and industry self-regulation. (PBOC, 2014)  
4.6 Repayment problems and defaults 
  According to China Financial Stability Report (2014), the regulatory authorities should 
pay more attention to the repayment problems and debt default risk which will lead to the 
systematic financial risk. In early 2014, a number of trust products and listed (publicly offered) 
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corporate bonds encountered repayment difficulties. Eiichi (2014) states that there are two 
possible scenarios for these products have the repayment problems and defaults. The first 
scenario is that when the commercial banks make the trust products, but they are responsible 
for their redemption. But if the commercial banks has accepted some of the responsibility in 
order to preserve their reputation, overseas credit rating agencies would regard the amounts as 
contingent liabilities on the bank‘s balance sheets and possibly lower their ratings. Particularly, 
if banks listed on overseas exchanges were subject to a possible re-rating, this could have a 
knock-on effect on overseas financial markets. The second scenario is that if a large number of 
trust products encountered repayment difficulties, even if confined to particular parts of the 
country or sectors of the economy, this could have a knock-on effect, especially on domestic 
financial markets, if other companies in the same sector with corporate bonds were re-rated. 
This would inevitably affect the confidence of overseas investors (Eiichi, 2014).  
In either these two scenarios, the initial response of the government, the financial 
authorities, market participants and proposals for a convincing resolution would clearly be 
crucial when there was a knock-on effect on financial markets. The regulatory authorities 
should improve monitoring, deal promptly with any defaults, and to avert any regional or 
systemic risks. 
4.7 Challenges to China central bank’s monetary policy 
  The rise of China‘s shadow banking also challenges the PBOC‘s monetary policy. 
Traditionally, the monetary policy of China central bank is more M2 oriented. From the first 
month to the third month in every quarter, the incensement of the renminbi deposits are kept 
on growing. In the first month, the growth of the renminbi deposit is always negative. It is 
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because of the rise of the WMPs leading to the new trend. Because at the end of every quarter, 
China Banking Regulatory Commission and People's Bank of China will assess the 
commercial bank‘s deposit to lend ratio and other indicators. Thus, the commercial bank has 
the motivation to maintain higher renminbi deposits at the end of every quarter. In order to 
avoid the regulation, the commercial banks tend to issue the wealth management products with 
the maturity less than three months at the beginning of every quarter. 
Table 4.4 China’s M2 in 2012    CNY Billion 
January 85109.09 
February  85589.89 
March 86717.14 
April 89556.55 
May 88960.4 
June 90004.88 
July 92449.12 
August 91907.24 
September 92489.46 
October 94368.88 
November 94483.24 
December 97414.88 
 Source: People‘s Bank of China 
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 From the Table 4.4, we can see the money supply is decrease at the first month of every 
quarter. The money supply in March 2012 was 89556.55 billion. It has decreased to 88960.4 
billion in April. We can also see in the first month of the third quarter which is July, compared 
to the money supply in June, the money supply has decreased from 92499.12 billion to 
91907.24 billion. According to the definition from Gwarthrey (2004), M1, the narrowest 
definition of the money supply, is composed of currency, checking deposits, and traveler‘s 
checks. M2, which contains M1 plus the various savings components indicated, is 
approximately five times the size of M1. In fact, from the first quarter of 2012, the growth of 
the M2 in the first month every quarter shows a negative trend.  
Figure 4.6 Rate of Increase of Money Supply over the Previous Corresponding Period 
(in %) 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculation 
From the Figure 4.6, we can see the negative growth at the first month of each quarter; 
the money supply has decreased over 0.5% compared to the money supply in March. The 
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same happened in July.  It illustrates the rise of shadow banking activity has influence the 
traditional monetary policy‘s effectiveness such as M2. 
4.8 The key risk indicators to identify a financial crisis 
The refinancing risk within the banking industry, as well as the liquidity risk in the 
Chinese housing market, has heightened the default risk of borrowers and even the overall 
market risk in the financial market (Linden, 2014). In order to better understand the driver 
indicators that lead to a deterioration in stability. It is essential for the investors to identify the 
key indicators. 
4.8.1 House prices 
The Chinese housing market is distinguished from most countries by some certain 
specific characteristics. Firstly, in China, the property is regarded as an investment; 
householders are tending to buy the second or third house as an investment tool. It was caused 
by the few investment alternatives apart from bank savings and equities for the Chinese 
household. Secondly, the continuous urbanization process is fuelling the demand for resident 
properties. Thirdly, it is because of the household‘s relatively small mortgage debt.  The 
Figure 4.7 will illustrate the mortgage loans to household disposal income from 2007 to 2013. 
We can see in this period, this rate has not reached 26% that is very low compared to other 
economies. 
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Figure 4.7 Mortgage loans as percentage to household disposable income, in % 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013) 
From the Figure 4.7, we can see the mortgage loans to household disposable income ratio 
in these eight years is smaller than 26%, although, from 2008, this ratio has increased for the 
last few years. But compared to the western peers, this ratio is quite low. Currently, the 
Chinese housing market is supported mainly by new investments and domestic real estate 
speculations, where large sums of money for real estate developments are sourced from 
WMPs. The house price is becoming weak; it would lower returns and increase the default risk 
of loan repayments. Linden, (2012) states that the growth of vacant apartments is a resolute of 
Chinese constructors‘ foremost aim of attracting investment rather than contributing to 
residential demand is becoming the more serious problem.  
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4.8.2 Financial performance of the Chinese commercial banks   
As a result of a large portfolio of bad loans, the commercial banks in China were 
extremely weak and unprofitable. Within a decade, the large banks were recapitalized and 
restructured through government capital transfers. 
Table 4.5 Financial indicators of the five large commercial banks, 2012 year-end 
  ROE 
(%) 
CAR 
(%) 
COR 
(%) 
NPL 
(ration) 
(%) 
NPL 
coverage 
ratio (%) 
International 
ranking( Tier 1 
capital 
volume) 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China 
23 13.7 10.6 0.9 296 1 
China Construction 
Bank  
22 14.3 11.3 1 271 5 
Bank of China 18.1 13.6 10.5 1 236 9 
Agriculture Bank of 
China 
20.7 12.6 9.7 1.3 326 10 
Banks of 
Communications 
17.9 14.1 11.2 0.9 251 23 
All commercial 
banks 
19.8 13.3 10.6 1 296   
Source: Annual reports of Banks (2013), China Banking regulatory Commission (2013) 
The Table 4.5 illustrates some indicators for the capital position for the big five. The 
ROE for all these big five banks is around 20%, which is quiet high in banking industry. It 
illustrates that the Chinese banks have good ability in terms of profitability. The reason is that 
the Chinese government sets the maximum interest rate paid on savings deposit and minimum 
interest rate they charged on loans. This policy has enabled banks to generate high returns. 
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Figure 4.8 Non-performing loans of Chinese commercial banks (percentage of total loans) 
 
Source: China banking regulatory Commission (2013) 
According to the Basel II capital adequacy ratio, all the commercial banks‘ capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) must be higher than 8 %. From Table 4.5, we can see all these big five 
banks has reached the requirement. Figure 4.8 illustrates that the non-performing loans ratio 
has improved strongly within these few years. In 2007, it was more than 6 % while in 2012 it 
was close to 1%. The reason for the lower NPL is partly attributed to bank restructurings, so 
the amount of bad loans has declined. And the increase of the dominator can also contribute to 
the decline of this ratio. This dominator effect is caused by the strong growth of lending. 
Internationally, the current NPL ratio of the Chinese banks is low. According to the statistics, 
the NPL ratio for some foreign banks is higher than 1%. For instance, the NPL ratio was 3.2% 
in Dutch banks in 2013, 2.9% in Germany in 2012, 8.2% in Spain in 2013, 15.1% in Italy in 
2013 (World Bank, 2014) The overall bank loans ratio of Chinese bank is 1%, the percentage 
vary considerably from sector to sector. 1.4% for manufacturing, 0.7% for real estate, 0.6% for 
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construction and 0.3% for resident mortgage (Buitelaar, 2013) The figure for resident 
mortgage is so low because the strict supervision in recent years. As home buyers are required 
to make a down payment of 30% on their mortgage, Chinese householders are less heavily 
indebted than in many western countries.  
Figure 4.9 Provision coverage and non-performing loans (NPL)  
Billions RMB, percentage NPL respectively 
 
Source: China banking regulatory Commission (2013) 
The banking supervisor requires bank to maintain high provisions for their non-
performing loans. From the Figure 4.9, in 2007, provisions for non-performing loans were 
only 40% of the outstanding amount. Thanks to bank recapitalization and restructurings, the 
amount of bad loans has declined significantly. On the other hand, the provisions have been 
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raised. As a result, provisions for non-performing loans are now almost three times greater 
than the outstanding amount of such loans.  
4.8.3 Interest and Inflation Rates 
   Currently, China‘s deposit interest rate is still controlled by the People‘s Bank of China. 
Investing in shadow banking products can earn a high net interest margin between the 
controlled and the black market rates. This high margin attracts investors seeking high returns, 
further stimulating the rapid development of shadow banking in China (Linden, 2014). 
Figure 4.10 Basic rates on One year deposit and annual inflation rate 
 
Source: PBOC (2014) 
   From the Figure 4.10, the deposit interest rate is quiet stable, ranging from 2 % to 4%, 
but the fluctuation band of the inflation rate is wide. China‘s average inflation rate has 
declined a lot from 2011. In 2011, the annual inflation rate was about 5.5%, it declined 
dramatically to 1.5% this year. As China has the potential risk of deflation, the authority has 
taken some expansion monetary policy to stimulate the economy and increase the inflation 
72 
 
rate. A higher interest rate would reduce the net interest margin, thereby reducing the amount 
of funds flowing into shadow banking products and increasing the risk of a fund shortage. This 
is the reason shadow banking finance develops so rapidly since 2010 this is because, in that 
period, the Chinese inflation rate was so high. 
4.9 Possible solution to minimize the risk of shadow banking  
Many enterprises in China are engaging in shadow banking in order to evade taxes and 
regulation. This phenomenon has a negative influence on the development on the China‘s 
economy and the stability of our society. The Chinese government has published some 
relevant laws to contain illegal fund-raising. The legal explanation concerning judging illegal 
fund-raising is a meaningful statute that mainly focuses on defining what kind of enterprise 
fund-raising is illegal. 
   The problem of the liquidity of the interbank market is likely to recur as improvements 
are made to regulate the shadow banking. So it becomes very necessary to control the liquidity 
of the interbank market. From the document No107, The application of Basel III to domestic 
banks is an attempt to control market liquidity risks. That the capital adequacy ratio of the 
banks whose balance sheets have been bolstered as a result of tighter regulation of shadow 
banking will meet the Basel III standards that the deadline for implementation of Basel III is 
2018, leaving several years to normalize China‘s shadow banking system.9   
                                                          
9 Document No. 107 is an attempt by the State Council at comprehensive regulation of China’s shadow banking 
system 
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4.9.1 Provision of fund-raising platforms for SMEs 
   Limited access to fund-raising has forced SMEs in China to borrow through the shadow 
banking system. To reduce shadow banking activity, more funding sources should be provided, 
particularly for SMEs. The Chinese government should accelerate the creation of capital 
markets and introduce new investment tools by, for example, relaxing restrictions on SMEs‘ 
issuance of preferred stocks. (PBOC, 2014) 
 4.9.2 Stress Testing on Banks 
Stress test are commonly used of the to analyze whether a bank has sufficient capital to 
withstand the impact of unfavorable economic scenarios and adverse developments in 
worldwide. But China rarely published the result in the public domain. Furthermore, they are 
not always standardized or aligned with international requirements and are only reviewed 
occasionally and unsystematically of the stress test which conducted by the local government. 
China Financial Stability Report (2014) states that standardized stress tests on banks and 
financial institutions systems are required, with all banks following the same scenarios and 
results disclosed to the public. Not only would this help both the government and banks to be 
prepared for any potential problems, but it would also raise general awareness about banking 
system health. 
4.9.3 Reform of Interest Rate Liberalization 
     Currently, the investors are earning high margins on shadow banking products, thus it 
will be very necessary for the linearization of the interest rate to allow the interest rate to 
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return to the market level, and reduce the net interest margin and thus the scale of shadow 
banking. Product returns would then be constrained by inherent credit risks. 
4.9.4 Reform Banking Regulation 
  For financial institutions that serve as the intermediaries for funds, shadow banking is a 
tool for avoiding supervisory management regulations through financial innovation. Banking 
authorities have established interest-rate regulations and relatively high reserve requirement 
ratios (20.0% in the case of large banks as of July 2013), and regulate bank lending through 
the loan-to-deposit ratio (75%) and window guidance, etc. As market competition has 
intensified, banks have come to use shadow banking as a tool for expanding lending in lieu of 
traditional channels in order to avoid regulations (RIETI, 2015). 
In 2010, the CBRC has imposed some restrictions on bank lending activities, thus the 
growth rate of bank loans has significantly reduced, and arguably these regulations have 
helped banks to reduce the risk inherent in regular operations, but this risk has merely shifted 
into shadow banking activities, which are harder to control. Regulators should relax the 
restrictions for loans so as to shift risk back to the traditional regulated platform, rendering this 
risk transparent to both investors and regulators. More direct measures to regulate off-balance 
sheet activities should also be implemented (CBRC, 2014).  
4.9.5 Tighter regulation of bank wealth management products 
China Securities Regulatory Commission has been taking some regulation on this 
problem of WMPs.  On 30 September 2011 (with immediate effect), the CBRC promulgated a 
circular entitled Notice on Further Strengthening Risk Management of Wealth Management 
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Business. The circular calls on banks to develop wealth management products ―objectively,‖ 
are more transparent in their product disclosure, provide separate plan calculations, and 
manage their affairs properly. Because most banks' wealth management products are not stated 
on their balance sheets, as banks do not assume the risk of their own, in general, given that the 
contract documents do not guarantee the principal or interest rates. By implementing this 
regulation measure on WMPs. It will require the banks to disclose the information of WMPs 
and enhance the regulation. 
4.9.6 Tighter regulation of collaboration between banks and trust companies 
   On 12 August 2010, the CBRC promulgated a circular clarifying and tightening the 
rules governing collaboration between banks and trust companies on wealth management 
products, services, investments, and risk management. In particular, the CBRC called on the 
banks to put back on their balance sheets in two years (2010 and 2011) the assets they had 
previously removed and to raise their loan-loss reserve ratios to 150%. Currently, the 
collaboration of banks and trust companies are less regulated. And the trust companies 
continue to invest its funds in the financing platforms of local governments; the real estate 
industry; and industries with high contamination. The investments by trust company to those 
areas can lead to heavy resource consumption, and excess investment. In addition, they could 
induce a moral hazard and adverse selection by hiding the problem of bad loans by making up 
for any losses.  This measure can set a high standard of the collaboration between banks and 
trust companies.  
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4.10 Revision of the Chapter 
In this Chapter, we specifically explained all kinds of the risk of the shadow banking 
finance in China, wealth management products and trust products play the major acting role in 
the Chinese shadow banking system and create the risk. Due to the short maturity of the 
WMPs, it becomes attractive for both asset side and the liability side. But because of the lack 
of transparency and off-balance-sheet treatment of both assets and liabilities side and the 
maturity mismatch, it will cause the liquidity problem. Also, trust products are the other very 
important tools that cause the shadow banking. Especially, the local government uses the local 
government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to cooperate with trust companies to raise funds. In 
recent years, similar to the developed western countries, the China‘s debt to GDP ratio has 
increased very sharply. Therefore, it brings the debt concern. Also, with the growing of the 
internet finance in recent years, it develops rapidly without so much regulation. Then, these 
risky financial activities contain the credit risk which means potential repayment problem and 
default risk. Finally, all these modern financial products and risky financial activities can 
challenge the central bank‘s monetary policy of China. After introducing all the potential 
explode of these risks, and then we used several indicators to identify the financial crises. For 
instance, the indicator of house prices, the performance of the commercial bank, interest and 
inflation rate. Finally, we suggested the possible solutions how can regulate or decrease the 
risks. We recommend the tightening of regulation on WMPs management and the increase the 
collaboration between banks and trust companies. And it will be a possible solution to 
implement the stress tests on banks and disclose the results to the public and to reform banking 
regulation and interest rate liberalization. 
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5 Conclusion 
The aim of the thesis was to identify both the positive effect of the Chinese shadow 
banking and more importantly the potential risks of this activity and then we put forward some 
possible solutions that could enhance the regulation and reduce the risks. The structure of the 
thesis was as follows. In Chapter 2, the literature knowledge of the financial system in China 
has been described. We introduced the theoretical background of not only the traditional 
banking system, Non-banking financial institution. But also the shadow banking has also been 
described. In Chapter 3, the similarity and difference of shadow banking system in China and 
US has been compared. By comparison the different situations of the shadow banking system, 
we can emphasize the special characteristics of Chinese shadow banking. The most significant 
characteristics are that the Chinese shadow banking are dominated by WMPs and trust 
products. In chapter 4, we mentioned all the potential risks and challenges of the shadow 
banking system, it including challenging the monetary policy of Chinese central bank, 
liquidity risk by the mismatch of the WMPs, credit default risk of the shadow banking 
financial products and more seriously the systematically financial risk. Finally, we suggested 
the possible solutions to regulate the risks. We recommend to tightening the regulation on 
WMPs and to implement the stress tests on banks. Reforming on interest rate liberalization 
can be an effective method to enhance the regulation. 
In China, there is a concern about the rapid expansion of shadow banking financing, such 
as the WMPs sold by commercial banks and the trust products sold by trust companies. This 
rapid expansion of shadow banking in China is the result of financial innovation to meet the 
needs by pouching, investing and intermediate funds in the Chinese financial market. To be 
more specific, from the viewpoint of pouching funds, the real economy started to face a 
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shortage funds in 2010 since the tight monetary policy in China. Thus, the real estate industry, 
the financing platform of local government and small and medium private enterprises are 
facing severe lack of fund. So they have to find an alternative way to get the fund, which 
contribute to the expansion of shadow banking. Secondly, from the viewpoint of investors, 
shadow banking provides new investment products other than bank deposits, equities, real 
estate, foreign exchange, etc. These new products, which provide a higher rate of return than 
the maximum bank deposit rates, are attractive to investors. Thirdly, for the intermediating 
funds (financial institutions that serve as the intermediaries for funds), shadow banking is a 
tool for avoiding supervisory management regulations through financial innovation. We 
compared to the reason of shadow banking activity in China and US. The shadow banking 
finance is different in these two countries in terms of the size of shadow banking; reason 
causes the shadow banking and the regulation measures. In the US, shadow banking generally 
means an investment management scheme, such as asset-backed commercial paper, conduits, 
or structured investment vehicles (SIVs), that employs excessive leverage to maintain margins 
by raising short-term funds and investing them in long-term assets. Shadow banking in Europe 
and the US can be said to have been born when asset securitization made rapid progress as 
part of financial innovation.  
Because of the existence of the financing platforms of local government, the funds 
financed by shadow banking are directly or indirectly flowing into the real estate market. 
Ultimately, the housing prices are keeping increasing to become the potential risk of the 
housing bubble that will continue to develop to the systematic risk of the Chinese financial 
market. Besides that, the shadow banking finance has a lot of risks. Not only may the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies and financial supervision decrease, but also shadow 
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banking can adversely impact the management of regular financial institutions. To prevent or 
minimize the risks we recommend the tightening of the regulation imposed on WMPs 
management and increase the collaboration between banks and trust companies. And it could 
be a possible solution to implement the stress tests on banks and disclose the results to the 
public and to reform banking regulation and interest rate liberalization. 
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Annex 1    Rate of Increase of Money Supply over the Previous Corresponding Period (in %) 
Year 
                
Money 
and 
      
Quasi-
Money 
      
Quasi-
Money 
Mone
y 
Currency 
in 
Corporat
e 
Corporate Personal   
(M2) (M1) 
Circulatio
n (M0) 
Demand Time Savings Other 
      Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits 
2005 17.6 11.8 11.9 11.7 21.1 30.4 18.0 31.3 
2006 17.0 17.5 12.7 18.9 16.7 17.2 14.6 36.3 
2007 16.7 21.1 12.2 23.5 14.3 21.2 6.8 63.2 
2008 17.8 9.1 12.7 8.2 23.2 28.1 26.3 -1.5 
2009 27.7 32.4 11.8 37.7 25.2 37.7 19.7 39.4 
2010 19.7 21.2 16.7 22.1 18.9 28.7 16.3 16.0 
2011 13.6 7.9 13.8 6.7 16.8 18.1 16.2 17.7 
2012 13.8 6.5 7.7 6.2 17.6 17.6 16.6 25.1 
2013 13.6 9.3 7.1 9.7 15.6 18.8 13.5 19.5 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2014)  
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Annex 2 Money Supply at Year- end        (100Million RMB) 
Year 
                
Money 
and 
              
Quasi-
Money 
Money 
Currency 
in 
Corporate 
Quasi-
Money 
Corporat
e 
Personal   
(M2) (M1) 
Circulation 
(M0) 
Demand   Time Savings Other 
      Deposits   Deposits Deposits 
Deposit
s 
2008 475166 166217 34219.0 131998.2 308949.5 60103.1 217885.4 30961 
2009 606225 220001 38246.0 181755.5 386223.5 82284.9 260771.7 43166 
2010 725851 266621 44628.2 221993.4 459230.3 105858 303302.5 50069 
2011 851590 289847 50748.5 239099.2 561743.2 166616 352797.5 42329 
2012 974148 308664 54659.8 254004.5 665484.6 195940 411362.6 58181 
2013 1106525 337291 58574.4 278716.6 769233.9 232696 467031.1 69506 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2014)  
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Annex 3 Official Interest Rates of Deposits of Financial Institutions (% p.a.) 
Item 
Oct.20,201
0 
Dec.26,201
0 
Feb.09,201
1 
Apr.06,201
1 
July.07,201
1 
Jun.08,201
2 
July.06,2
012 
Demand 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.35 
Time               
   3-
Month 
1.91 2.25 2.60 2.85 3.10 2.85 2.60 
   6-
Month 
2.20 2.50 2.80 3.05 3.30 3.05 2.80 
   1-Year 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.25 3.00 
   2-Year 3.25 3.55 3.90 4.15 4.40 4.10 3.75 
   3-Year 3.85 4.15 4.50 4.75 5.00 4.65 4.25 
   5-Year 4.20 4.55 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.10 4.75 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014) 
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Annex 4 Changes in Non-performing Loans and the Provisioning Coverage Ratio of 
Commercial Banks in China 
Year Balance of non-
performing loans 
(Billion Yuan) 
Non-performing ratio 
(%) 
Provision coverage 
ratio (%) 
2006 1254.9 7.09 34.3 
2007 1268.4 6.17 41.4 
2008 568.2 2.45 116.6 
2009 497.3 1.58 153.2 
2010 433.6 1.10 217.7 
2011 428.2 0.96 278.1 
2012 492.9 0.95 295.5 
Note: Values at period end 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the "CBRC 2012 Annual Report" of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission 
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Annex 5 Size of the (Narrowly Defined) Shadow Banking System in China 
Year Size of bank‘s wealth 
management products 
(Billion Yuan) 
Size of trust 
company‘s trust 
products (Billion 
Yuan) 
Total ( Billion 
Yuan) 
Percentage of 
GDP (%) 
2007 1327 949 2276 8.6 
2008 960 1223 2183 7.0 
2009 1015 2016 3031 8.9 
2010 2500 3040 5540 13.8 
2011 5000 4811 9811 20.7 
2012 7100 7471 14571 28.1 
March 
2013 
8200 8730 16930 26 (estimate) 
Note: Values at period end 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Wind Information, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, and the China Trustee Association 
 
 
 
 
 
